SECOND PRIZE ESSAY: 2023 CHURCHILL ESSAY CONTEST

He Who Has The Youth:
The Rise and Fall of Nashi as an Instrument of the Putin Regime in the Wake of the Orange Revolution

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The Orange Revolution is often regarded as a mere prelude to the later Euromaidan protests in Ukraine – a dress rehearsal for the more significant set of pro-democratic demonstrations that would occur a decade later. Understandably so, while it was undoubtedly a milestone on the long-haul journey towards Ukrainian independence practical effects of the Orange Revolution were few in Ukraine itself. Votes may have been re-counted at the time, but the protested-against president came back with a vengeance only a few years later and managed to undo the few reforms won by the Orange Revolution.[1] As far as inciting far-reaching changes in the Ukrainian political sphere the Euromaidan was indeed the greater of the two protests. Paradoxically the loudest echo of the Orange Revolution was felt *not* in Ukraine, but in Russia and that echo is Vladimir Putin's direct involvement in guiding the ideological development of Russian youth. Putin and his government were deeply distrustful of the "colored revolutions" in general and of the Orange Revolution in particular. Exemplified in his founding and oversight of the Nashi movement in the early 2000s, the Orange Revolution made the winning over of the young a key target of the Putin regime. Nashi was crafted as way to keep young Russians loyal to Putin and his government, became a weapon for the state to deploy from a distance, and finally overstepped the mark and was quietly dissolved. Nashi is not generally discussed in

[1] Paul D'Anieri, *Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War* (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Western analyses of the Putin era, but this group deserves to be more than a footnote. Its creation demonstrates the degree to which the Russian state feared the possibility of political protests and degree to which Putin himself was willing to go to prevent them.

In late 2004 and early 2005, protesters gathered across the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv to protest state corruption and election rigging. The protesters eventually succeeded in having a re-vote called during the widely-distrusted 2004 presidential election. This re-count would show opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko as the clear winner and would strike fear into the heart of the Putin regime. The Kremlin had invested heavily in the incumbent Viktor Yanukovych's campaign and had expected to be assured of his victory and of Ukraine's loyalty to the Russian orbit. Angela Stent describes "a series of economic and political concessions" offered by the Kremlin should Ukrainians vote in a manner convenient to Russia.[2] It is clear that Putin took a personal interest in ensuring Yanukovych's election as he made pro-Yanukovych statements to the media in the buildup to the election, and even "traveled to Kyiv and lectured Ukrainians on the need to back his chosen candidate." [3] Stent goes on to say that Putin was confident enough in his machinations to "congratulat[e] Yanukovych on his win – before the results were announced." [4] When protestors and Western pressures made a successful case for the re-counting of ballots and the subsequent ascension of Yushenko, Putin was confronted with the existential fear of losing Ukraine to a malevolent West. It had become clear – at least to Putin that "Moscow's candidate had lost and Washington's had won." [5] Ukraine may have declared its independence from Russia in 1991, but it was not until the Orange Revolution that the nation

[2] Angela Stent, *Putin's World: Against The West and With The Rest* (Hachette Book Group, 2019), p. 191.
[3] Peter Dickinson, "How Ukraine's Orange Revolution Shaped Twenty-First Century Geopolitics", Atlantic Council, November 22nd 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-ukraines-orange-revolution-shaped-twenty-first-century-geopolitics/.
[4] Stent, *Putin's World*, p.192.
[5] Ibid., p. 192.

actually began to break from the mould in which Russia had cast it. For the Putin regime, this was a devastating blow. Graeme Herd writing for *Connections* went so far as to refer to the Orange Revolution and its aftermath as "Russia's worst foreign policy defeat in the post-Soviet period."[6] Gripped with fears of an "orange virus" that might jump the Ukrainian border and ravage Russia with ideas of electoral accountability and civil rights, the Kremlin took immediate steps to neutralize the threat.

The Orange Revolution was not only about the future of democracy in Ukraine, but about the history of the Ukraine as well. Stent describes aftermath of Yushchenko's election as an opening salvo in a "battle of historical narratives."[7] One of the controversial events being discussed at this time was the Holodomor, a man-made famine of the Soviet era which was being discussed openly as a genocide for the first time. Yushchenko himself was instrumental in this change, opening a national institute for researching and memorializing the famine, and referencing the famine in his inauguration speech in 2004. [8] It is not likely that Putin failed to notice the connection between the coloured revolutions and Ukraine's first major attempt to separate itself from "a Russian historical narrative that …emphatically downplayed it [the Holodomor] …[and] denie[d] any particular Ukrainian suffering".[9] In the re-organization of history surrounding Russia and Ukraine in the aftermath of the Orange revolution, Putin may have decided that if the past had become uncertain he needed to refocus his efforts on the future.

The Orange Revolution had been driven by a younger, post-communist generation

[6] Graeme Herd, "Russia and the Orange Revolution: Response, Rhetoric, Reality?", *Connections* Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2005): pp. 15-28, p.18, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26323167.
[7] Stent, *Putin's World*, p.193.
[8] Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War On Ukraine* (Penguin Random House, 2017), p.418.
[9] Ibid., p.420.

through organizations like Pora who called for government transparency and an increase in democratic freedoms. [10] The Russian state feared that Russian youth might copy those in Ukraine and demand a turn to democracy. Some smaller protests in Russian cities had already made it clear to Putin that the "orange virus" was indeed contagious and that the regime's hold over the younger generation was far more fragile than he had assumed. In light of this, Putin and his government sought a way recapture hearts and minds. He found his model in Vasily Yakemenko's pro-regime group Walking Together.[11] Walking Together was already openly supportive of Putin and hostile to his adversaries, but after the Orange Revolution they became a recipient of state support and personal attentions from Putin. Re-christened Nashi, meaning "ours", and obliquely funded via Kremlin partners like Gazprom, Nashi became a crucial component of the Kremlin's youth policy. That the state's turn towards Nashi was a direct result of the fears sparked by the Orange Revolution is neatly summed up by Eva Hartog writing for *The Moscow Times* "Nashi was a response to the kind of youth activism that fueled Ukraine's Orange Revolution …the Kremlin needed a loyal presence on the streets to act as a buffer in case unrest spilled into Russia".[12] It was a case of fighting fire with fire, or in this case ensuring that disillusioned young people take up a loyalist fanaticism instead of agitating for change.

The Russian youth were, as a whole, ripe for the kind of camaraderie and purpose that Nashi provided. This generation had grown up in the chaos of the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s, but had no memories of Soviet prosperity as their parents and grandparents did. This

[10] Olena Nikolayenko, "Pora! Youth's Mobilization in Ukraine" in *Youth Movements and Elections in Eastern Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 172. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108241809.007
[11] Tatiana Stanovaya, "The Fate of the Nashi Movement: Where Will the Kremlin's Youth Go?", Institute of Modern Russia, March 26th 2013, https://imrussia.org/en/politics/420-the-fate-of-the-nashi-movement-where-will-the-kremlins-youth-go.
[12] Eva Hartog, "A Kremlin Youth Movement Goes Rogue", The Moscow Times, April 8th 2016, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/04/08/a-kremlin-youth-movement-goes-rogue-a52435.

generational gap isolated the young people from their older relatives and led age to be "the most widespread indicator of discrimination young Russians say are confronted with." [13] Hopelessness also pervaded the employment record of many Russian youths during this period. Despite being more educated than their parents' generation and generally entering the labour market early, young Russians were found to be "not particularly satisfi[ed] … in terms of salary for instance."[14] Seeing Putin swoop in to end the war in Chechnya and restore some level of stability and economic prosperity primed many of the future Nashi commissars for hero worship. A study undertaken by the Swiss Academy for Development in 2009 found a startling disparity between the level of trust young Russians placed in their government on the whole and in Putin himself. While the study found that young people were generally dissatisfied with Russia's political system they "trust[ed] the leader in charge of the country and [were] confident that President Putin [would] defend Russia's interests" but that the situation "look[ed] very different when young Russians ex- press [sic] their opinions on other members of the political elite." [15] His superhero-strongman behaviour and his enticing promises of not only a glorious future for all Russia, but covetable perks for those involved in the movement proved a siren song for a number of young people. Creating a cult of personality around the figure of Putin as the leader of United Russia, Nashi has drawn comparisons to the Kommosol and to the Hitler Youth earning the oft-derisive epithet of the "putinjugend."[16] It is important to note that while Nashi claimed approximately 300,000 members at its height, it was never as pervasive as something like the Hitler Youth. It was also described by Sean Guillory as less organized than the Young

[13] Denis Dafflon, "Youth In Russia – The Portrait of a Generation in Transition", The Swiss Academy for Development, 2009, p.10, https://www.stiftung-drja.de/_Resources/Persistent/96be4c8b76cf0a8c527bc5ecd5b6876c73ca6abd/sad-youth-in-russia.pdf.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., p.22.
[16] Juliane Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism,* (Oxford University Press, 2010), p.364.

Communists of the 1970s or 1980s and more similar to that of 1920s vintage – smaller in number but "far more activist and militant." [17] Outside of urban centers, where job availability ran lower and hopelessness ran higher than in Moscow, the allure was particularly strong. Nashi stressed ideals of loyalty, nationalism, and discipline to its members and used a strict hierarchical structure to both motivate and punish its disciples. Nashi provided its members with opportunities to advance and gain material benefits like vehicles and apartments, as well as a purpose – something to believe in and to strive for. This was attractive to many young Russians who generally felt insecurity in both "economic and social spheres."[18] Many of Nashi's activities appeared innocent –even noble – enough; hosting summer camps on a lake in the Tver region, getting young Russians involved in political life, and providing a mentorship structure to build comradery and relationships between its members.

Innocent-sounding it may have been but, these summer camps were more than an opportunity for Nashi affiliates to socialize. Described in *Putin's Kiss* as "laboratories of youth policy" Nashi events like the camps were an opportunity to immerse its members in Kremlin-approved values including natalism and anti-Western nationalism.[19] The regime had concerns about low Russian birthrates and pushed Nashi members to get married and procreate for the good of the nation. According to Anselm Waldermann, "a mass wedding for 30 couples" occurred during Nashi's 2007 summer camp at Lake Seliger where members were encouraged to

[17] Sean Guillory, "Nashi Unleashed", SRB Podcast, Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, May 8th 2007, para.3, https://srbpodcast.org/2007/05/08/nashi-unleashed/.
[18] Denis Dafflon, "Youth In Russia – The Portrait of a Generation in Transition", The Swiss Academy for Development, 2009, p.44, https://www.stiftung-drja.de/_Resources/Persistent/96be4c8b76cf0a8c527bc5ecd5b6876c73ca6abd/sad-youth-in-russia.pdf.
[19] Lise Birk Pedersen, "Putin's Kiss", Kino Lorber, YouTube, August 17th 2022, video, 24:24, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjyvvzIwMb7AhWoFjQIHby3CFoQwqsBegQIIhAF&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DKnh1Um8Ulfc&usg=AOvVaw0vL8fo-3TgneMgzVBUqGmr.

"have more babies" in order to "solve Russia's demographic problems."[20] Valerie Sperling's book, *Sex, Politics, & Putin*, also mentions this aspect of Nashi's annual camps, describing a scene in which Nashi members were applauded for "pair[ing] up overnight" and offered help in applying for a marriage licence.[21] Beyond natalism, Nashi materials stressed anti-Westernism and "xenophobic nationalism" as key ideals for their followers to espouse. Julie Hemment cites Nashi's army recruitment video as typical of the rhetoric used within the group, in the video Russia is painted as "under siege from a rapacious West" which intends to invade Russia under the guise of democracy promotion.[22] Equating Western democracy and its promoters with the downfall of Russia instilled in Nashi-affiliated youth a profound distrust of any anti-regime sentiment. Putin had positioned himself as the sole defender of true Russia, ensuring the support of the next generation. In gaining Nashi's loyalty, Putin had managed to purchase anti-revolutionary insurance – even if some Russians demanded more democratic freedoms Nashi guaranteed that there would be a strong youth-led pushback. In the words of Timothy Snyder, "it makes a difference whether young people go to the streets to defend a future or arrive in tanks to suppress one."[23] Tanks never formed a part of Nashi's arsenal, but the organization's successful dissemination of pro-Putin ideology removed the threat of young people "go[ing] to the streets" to demand regime change.

Nashi gained notoriety in mid-2000s for its outlandish acts of pseudo-political hooliganism. Besides organizing marches through Moscow and stomping (or spitting) on

[20] Anselm Waldermann, "Russian Youth and the Putin Cult", Spiegel International, November 2nd 2007, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nashi-movement-russian-youth-and-the-putin-cult-a-514891.html.
[21] Valerie Sperling, *Sex, Politics, & Putin: Political Legitimacy In Russia* (Oxford University Press, 2015), p.165.
[22] Julie Hemment, *Youth Politics In Putin's Russia: Producing Patriots and Entrepreneurs* (University of Indiana Press, 2015), p.83.
[23] Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom* (Penguin Random House, 2018), p.155.

portraits of opposition politicians, a favourite maneuver was to find out where opposition events or rallies were to be held and then to fill those squares with bussed-in Nashi members to block the opposition from occupying the space[24]. These were some of Nashi's tamer activities; while the group never officially claimed this action, the documentary *Putin's Kiss* shows what appears to be several Nashi lieutenants defecating on the vehicles of those they found objectionable.[25] While offensive and unquestionably juvenile, Nashi may have been dismissed as merely absurd if not for a series of events taking place between 2007 and 2011 and culminating in the well-publicised attack on liberal journalist Oleg Kashin in 2010. While Nashi never took responsibility for the crime, it is believed that the beating was carried out by Nashi affiliates in order to punish him for criticizing Putin's increasingly authoritarian policies on his blog.[26] Not only were citizens horrified by the extent of Kashin's injuries, but the lack of any serious attempts on the part of the Russian state to prosecute Nashi for the crime seemed to prove that Nashi could get away with anything. Nashi had become a group of highly nationalized, and fanatical young people "in an atmosphere of hatred [and] xenophobia" being given a carte blanche by a powerful government to express their intolerance through extreme violence. [27] Nashi's reign of terror already attracted foreign attention in 2007 when Nashi turned up to intimidate diplomats staying at the Estonian embassy. Their actions included harassing those entering and exiting the building, smashing windows, and putting up posters accusing the Estonian state of being - the old Kremlin standby - fascist. It was a well-organized campaign of intimidation and harassment, Nashi had members bussed in from across Russia to participate and

[24] Birk Pedersen, "Putin's Kiss".
[25]Ibid.
[26] Elena Milashina, "Impunity Still Reigns in Beating of Oleg Kashin", Committee to Protect Journalists, December 15th 2011, https://cpj.org/2011/12/impunity-still-reigns-in-beating-of-oleg-kashin/.
[27] Chloe Arnold, "Russian Group's Claims Reopen Debate On Estonian Cyberattacks", Radio Free Europe, March 30th 2009, para. 24 https://www.rferl.org/a/Russian_Groups_Claims_Reopen_Debate_On_Estonian_Cyberattacks_/1564694.html.

provided them with "a makeshift Internet café …a generator … [and] portable lavatories." [28]The siege of the embassy was apparently in response to the recent removal of a statue from the Estonian capital of Tallinn. The statue commemorated a Red Army soldier and removing it, according to Nashi, was an affront to Russian dignity and pride. [29] According to Radio Free Europe, Nashi also claimed responsibility for "a wave of sophisticated cyberattacks targeting the websites of the country's [Estonia] parliament, banks, newspapers, and government ministries" in 2007.[30] The hackers managed to freeze several key sectors of the Estonian online ecosystem, attracting attention from the international community including NATO.

The level of planning and funding involved in the cyber-attack and the embassy blockade led some sources to speculate that the Kremlin was not only not punishing Nashi, but actively using the group to express its disapproval while keeping its proverbial hands clean. Because Nashi is "nominally independent" anything they do is "one level removed from the Russian government" in spite of the Kremlin's well-known support of the group [31]. While Putin's United Russia party does have an official youth wing, it should be noted that this group has never developed Nashi's notoriety. At the time, it was suspected that the Russian government was behind the attacks as they were "embroiled in a bitter diplomatic dispute" with Estonia. [32] While the state denied all involvement, it was suspected that they deployed Nashi on their behalf. Considered in the context of other Nashi actions like the attack on Kashin, these incidents do appear more sophisticated and planned out than beating a man up in a dark alley. According to

[28] Christian Lowe, "Russian Protestors 'Lay Siege' to Estonian Embassy", Reuters, May 3rd 2007, para. 12 https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-estonia-russia-scene-idUKL0354549820070503
[29] Arnold, "Russian Group's Claims Reopen Debate".
[30] Ibid., para. 1.
[31] Noah Shachtman, "Kremlin Kids: We Launched the Estonian Cyber War", Wired, March 11th 2009, para. 5, https://www.wired.com/2009/03/pro-kremlin-gro/.
[32] Arnold, "Russian Group's Claims Reopen Debate", para.6.

Radio Free Europe the fact that Nashi spokesman Konstantin Goloskokov "spoke freely …with no apparent fear of prosecution" about the attacks points to "back[ing] by higher forces."[33] Yevgeny Volk corroborates the claims that Nashi did not act alone saying that as Nashi "is strictly controlled by the governmental structures … they would have given [their] tacit approval" for the cyberattacks. [34] Interviewed by Reuters, Estonian ambassador Marina Kaljurand further questioned the level of organization needed to carry out something like the demonstrations at the Estonian embassy. She claimed that it was not a "spontaneous expression of anger" but a rigorously planned and well-funded political message delivered via teenagers throwing rocks.[35] Writing for *The Guardian*, journalist James Jones also claimed that "scrawny students, with their powerful political protection" were the ones ruling the streets in Moscow and went on to describe a scene he had witnessed wherein several Nashi members were approached by police for spray-painting political messages outside the American embassy.[36] When the "notoriously brutal Russian police" approached the group members, Jones was stunned to see them "instantly surrounded, filmed and forced to show their documents by members of Nashi." [37] He points to this event as proof that Nashi were far more than simply endorsed by the Kremlin.

Although the Russian government neglected to punish Nashi for its various acts of violence and harassment throughout the mid-2000s, by the end of this decade the Kremlin began to withdraw its support for the movement. Nashi was getting out of hand, and it was beginning to reflect poorly on the state that was supporting it, especially as the molestation of the Estonian

[33] Ibid., para. 20.
[34] Ibid., para. 22.
[35] Christian Lowe, "Russian Protestors 'Lay Siege' to Estonian Embassy", Reuters, May 3rd 2007, para. 17 https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-estonia-russia-scene-idUKL0354549820070503.
[36] James Jones, "Putin's Youth Movement Provides A Sinister Backdrop to Russia's Protests", The Guardian, December 8th 2011, para. 5, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/08/putin-russia-elections.
[37] Jones, "Putin's Youth Movement Provides A Sinister Backdrop to Russia's Protests", para. 5.

embassy attracted unflattering international attention. Various EU member states began denying visas to Nashi activists after the incident. [38] Some of their more outlandish acts had also begun to embarrass Putin domestically, the *Putin's Kiss* documentary points to an erotic calendar – in which female Nashi members posed in lingerie with captions like "Putin Is The Best" - made in honour of Putin's birthday as a case-in-point. [39] Not only was Nashi acting out in ways that detracted from their political image, but it appeared that the group had outlived its original usefulness. By the early 2010s, the Putin regime was firmly entrenched and the idea of a democratic uprising looked dramatically less likely than it had nearly a decade before. The "orange virus" had been well and truly cured, thus removing the need to focus state attentions on something like Nashi. As a final nail in the coffin tensions within the group had also started to boil over by this time, some members were beginning to resent Yakemenko's stranglehold on power within Nashi. As former Nashi spokeswoman Masha Drokova explains in *Putin's Kiss*, the only way to advance within the group was to be on Yakemenko's good side and some members had begun to feel shortchanged since it appeared that promotions were being meted out according to his whims.[40] Nashi was not fulfilling its obligations in other ways too, the glittering prizes promised to members who rose through the ranks had failed to materialize for most of them. Zakhar Prilepin describes it as "a horrible form of legalized prostitution" in reference to the "handful" of members out of "hundreds of thousands" who actually "got the careers that

[38] Sean Guillory, "Nashi Persona Non-Grata In EU", SRB Podcast, Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, January 20th 2008, https://srbpodcast.org/2008/01/20/nashi-persona-non-grata-in-eu/.
[39] Lise Birk Pedersen, "Putin's Kiss".
[40] Lise Birk Pedersen, "Putin's Kiss".

[were] promised to them."[41] The combination of Putin's increased disinterest and internal factionalism led Nashi to an anticlimactic end.

Nashi was effectively disbanded in 2013, but its offshoots continue to make themselves known in Russian sociopolitical life. One such heir to the throne of pro-Putin youth clubs is Network, which aims to create a more mature, urban version of Nashi. While this group claims several former Nashists among its ranks, Network's goal of creating "a young Putin intelligentsia" appears at odds with the more raucous, uncouth side of many Nashi activities in the early 2000s. [42] Other successors have stayed a more in-your-face, political-defecation-on-car-hoods Nashi-style course into the new era. Among them is StopKham, a group that has gained internet notoriety with videos of its members harassing people who have neglected to park their cars in designated areas. The group's focus has essentially been to "harass and publically shame" people into abiding by the letter of the law.[43] While this appears innocuous enough, their smear campaign has recently attracted the ire of the Kremlin for their molestation of government officials and other prominent Russian political figures. *Russia Beyond* claims that some sources in 2013 pointed to a potential Nashi revival. Although this has not happened yet, James Jones points out that the time may be right for re-Nashi-ization. Putin's regime is "becoming less predictable, and the risks of destabilization are growing."[44] [45] Although this was

[41] Zakhar Prilepin as quoted by Alice Ross & Emma Slater, "How Russia's Youth Movement Became Putin's Private Army", The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, April 20th 2012, para. 7, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-04-20/how-russias-youth-movement-became-putins-private-army.
[42] Tom Balmforth, "Network, Son of Nashi: New Youth Group Seeks To Woo Russia's Middle Class", Radio Free Europe, July 3rd 2014, para.9, https://www.rferl.org/a/network-russian-youth-group-nashi-/25444358.html.
[43] Eva Hartog, "A Kremlin Youth Movement Goes Rogue", The Moscow Times, April 8th 2016, para. 4, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/04/08/a-kremlin-youth-movement-goes-rogue-a52435.
[44] Alexéi Bausin, "Pro-Kremlin Youth Movement Nashi to be Revamped", Russia Beyond, March 7th 2013, https://www.rbth.com/politics/2013/03/07/pro-kremlin_youth_movement_nashi_to_be_revamped_23621.html.
[45] Jones, "Putin's Youth Movement Provides A Sinister Backdrop to Russia's Protests", para. 13.

written before the invasion of Ukraine, this has doubtlessly accelerated the rate of potential instability, meaning that the money spent on cultivating a crop of on-call political vigilantes via Nashi may once again prove itself well-spent.[46]

A group of teenagers marching lockstep through Moscow, inflicting punishments on all those who dare disagree with them sounds like a bizarre combination of an Orwellian dystopia and *Lord of the Flies*. That all of this was sanctioned by the state sounds a particularly dissonant note, but this is an only slightly exaggerated picture of Nashi at its height. Created to inoculate Russian youth against the "orange virus" of revolution that had then-recently gripped Ukraine, it seemed that this group could do no wrong in the eyes of the state during its zenith in the late 2000s. Its ranks swelled after Nashi's intoxicating promises of material goods, social capital, and principled action proved irresistible to disillusioned provincial youth. The Kremlin was then able to use Nashi to re-direct the frustrations and discontent of young Russians away from the regime and towards foreigners and members of the opposition. Nashi proved so potent as an anti-revolutionary prophylactic that it was able to be dissolved without re-igniting fears of a youth-led uprising less than a decade after its formation. It speaks to the overall success of the movement that in the end Nashi was so effective as to make itself obsolete.

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