FAR FROM INSIGNIFICANT: BRITAIN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND TO THE FORMATION OF NATO

1945-1960

Graeme Niedtner

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Simon Fraser University

With the end of the Second World War, both the United States and the United Kingdom were in a strong military and geopolitical position. The British had access to vast resources through their web of colonies and dominions and the United States had emerged as the world's pre-eminent economic and technological power. However, the realities of the post-1945 era transformed the World from one where Britain had been a politically dominant player, to one shaped by the bipolar struggle of the United States and the Soviet Union. With the decline in Britain's power relative to the Americans, many historians and international political commentators expressed the view that Britain had a limited role during this era. Avi Shlaim, a lecturer of Politics at the University of Reading, writes: "To the extent that Britain does feature in accounts of the cold war, it is usually treated not so much as an actor in its own right but as an appendage to the United States."[1] John Baylis, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, argued in 1984 that there is a growing body of historiography on NATO's creation that "play down somewhat Britain's leading role in the organization of Western security after the Second World War."[2] Although the focus of these sources vary, they give an indication of Britain in decline and the United States on an imminent global rise. Though the change in the British and American postwar geopolitical positions is not disputed, it is important to recognize that the United Kingdom still played a crucial role in shaping the Cold War and supporting the United States' global grand strategy.

[1] Avi Shlaim, "Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War," *International Affairs* 60, no. 1 (Winter 1983-1984): 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2618926.

[2] John Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 60, no. 4 (1984): 615, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2620045.

The British remained committed to opposing communist expansion and to creating an environment which allowed the United States to become involved in Western European security. The Americans' initial hesitations towards active security and nuclear relations with Britain, evident with the 1946 McMahon Act, led the British to develop their own nuclear weapon capabilities and to cooperate with NATO allies. This supported the Americans' strategic goal for security in Europe. The established historiography has been questioned, leading to histories that indicate Britain remained an active, innovative, and ready player to contribute to global security. The desire by the Americans to cooperate on military and nuclear priorities since the signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958 demonstrates that they recognized the United Kingdom as an important contributor to American safety. Through analysis of several significant events, rather than on a single event, this paper will illustrate how the British were important in forming a political and military relationship with the Americans in the early Cold War which helped the United States achieve postwar security in Europe. By understanding these issues as part of a larger trend of events, people can come to understand the factors that shaped the relationship between Britain, the United States, and NATO in the post-1945 era and recognize how the two nations remain bound by common political values seventy years later.

The journal articles, primary sources, and books consulted for the paper reflect only a fraction of the wealth of historiography that exists on British-American relations during the early Cold War. Some of the most valuable works for the development of this paper's argument were sources that portray Britain as a retreating power following 1945. David Reynolds' "Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-1945:

Towards a New Synthesis" was particularly useful in showing how historiography has

traditionally emphasized the rise of the United States and the decline of the United

Kingdom as a World power. His article also depicted how both nations depended upon

each other to counter the Axis threat in the Second World War. Some sources describe

Britain as a politically and militarily active country contradicting perceptions of their

limited influence during the Cold War. Avi Shlaim's "Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the

Cold War" was of particular interest as it openly challenged the existing historiography.

Other sources provided a variety of examples of Britain's Cold War activity. Nikolaj

Petersen's work, for example, was useful in demonstrating that Britain clearly had a role in

shaping the formation of NATO. His article "Who Pulled Whom and How Much? Britain, the

United States and the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty" helped to develop the ideas

raised by the first-hand accounts of British diplomats.

Author John Baylis provided some of the most valuable insight on the development of

Britain's nuclear weapons. His articles, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental

Commitment" and "The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for

Nuclear Interdependence," were invaluable because they demonstrated how British-

American relations evolved from political to military priorities as the Cold War unfolded.

Baylis is frequently mentioned by other historians examining the Cold War, showing how

his writing has influenced this area of historical study. The research by Richard Gott,

Martin A. Smith, and Kristan Stoddart showed the development of Britain's nuclear weapon

capability. Smith and Stoddart referred to Baylis' ideas, particularly that the American

military and political establishment recognized the need for active British involvement in

nuclear military planning. Alfred Goldberg illustrated the case that the British had atomic

weapon capabilities to help address American security concerns in Europe. All these sources showed Britain as a nation with much to offer the United States.

Primary sources include the texts of Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and the works of various British diplomats, including Frank Kenyon Roberts, Archibald Clark Kerr (Lord Inverchapel), and Sir Oliver Franks. Attention was given towards these diplomats and political figures because it was their opinions and decisions that helped direct their respective governments to grow the "Special Relationship." Diplomats in particular provide key insight in understanding the realities that the post Second World War and early Cold War era would have on Britain's relations with the United States. Winston Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri in 1946 was included as it highlighted the growing move to incorporate stronger ties to the United States. Such primary sources provide the context that demonstrates how the Cold War relationship between the two counties developed.

While the emergence of strong British-American relations was due to the personal convictions of individuals in both countries, certain politicians and diplomats stand out. Ernest Bevin, who became the British Foreign Secretary in 1945, is one such person. Prior to the Labour Party forming a Government in 1945, Bevin had focused his efforts on contributing to the needs of the British labour movement. According to Peter Weiler, Bevin's trade union background fueled his strongly anti-communist attitudes that had emerged from "years of struggle with Communists inside the British and international trade union movements."[3] Weiler further felt that Bevin was motivated by strong patriotic

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[3] Peter Weiler, *Ernest Bevin* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 146.

feelings and sentiment towards the British Empire.[4] The main impact of his time as

Foreign Secretary was to draw Britain into a closer relationship with the United States and

to actively oppose Soviet expansion in Europe.[5] For Alan Bullock, Bevin created

opportunities that allowed Britain to remain a global power. Bullock states Bevin provided

"his successors with the indispensable basis of security in the Western Alliance on which

they could then proceed to make whatever adjustments were necessary,"[6] including the

ability for Britain to become a nuclear weapon state after Bevin's tenure. Britain's ability to

contribute to the postwar order would have been unlikely had Bevin not been as active in

shaping the postwar world.

Archibald Clark Kerr (Lord Inverchapel), the British Ambassador in Washington from

1946 to 1948, was a significant figure. With diplomatic experience, including an

ambassadorship in Moscow, Kerr took on difficult challenges as the American public,

according to Donald Gilles, was cautious towards both British domestic and foreign policy.[7]

His time as ambassador was important as the crises of 1946 to 1948 forced the United

States to reconsider their postwar position and the need to establish stronger ties with

Britain in order to achieve greater global stability. Along with communicating Britain's

position, Kerr also provided information to Bevin on the American public's sentiment

which showed their increasing opposition of the Soviet Union. Gilles felt that the American

people had a more positive view of Britain because of the work achieved by Kerr.[8]

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[4] Ibid., 146-147.

[5] Ibid., 193.

[6] Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983), 847.

[7] Donald Gilles, *Radical Diplomat: The Life of Archibald Clark Kerr, Lord Inverchapel, 1882-1951* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 185.

[8] Ibid., 218.

Kerr's successor, Sir Oliver Franks, was another key individual in developing the British-American relationship. Appointed in 1948 and serving until 1952, his tenure saw the emergence of Cold War issues ranging from Berlin to Korea. Michael F. Hopkins argues that while Franks developed a positive relationship with Truman, it was with Secretary of State Dean Acheson that Franks built a strong working relationship. "With such a bridge it was easier to overcome difficulties. At times they recognised the short-comings of their own government's viewpoint and they devised means of altering each of them to achieve a solution."[9] Acheson's close relationship to Truman allowed Franks an unprecedented opportunity to develop Britain's relationship to be closely in line with American foreign policy.[10] The achievements of Franks and Kerr left a positive image of Britain in the United States and allowed the "Special Relationship" to grow.

Harry Truman, the American president from 1945-1953, was one of the key individuals for the United States in the development of their relationship with Britain in the early Cold War years. During his time as president, the Americans first tested and then used the atomic bomb, redeveloped the United States' foreign policy to respond to communist expansion in Europe (notably with the Truman Doctrine), helped in the formation of NATO, and responded to a number of global crises (primarily in Europe and East Asia). Truman's convictions on the postwar international crises were crucial in changing American attitudes and bringing the United States into a more active foreign policy. Writer Lloyd C. Gardner describes that "It is difficult to imagine how the United States could have managed economic recovery without the Soviet sphere of influence in

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[9] Michael F. Hopkins, *Oliver Franks and the Truman Administration: Anglo-American Relations, 1948-1952* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 253.
[10] Ibid., 254.

Eastern Europe. What incentive would Congress have had to support Truman's major initiatives without the cold war?"[11] Truman and his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, were instrumental in transforming the relationship with Britain from one of nations brought together by the struggle against the Axis to one of lasting cooperation.

Out of the turmoil of the Second World War, the United States emerged as the most powerful of victors. When Germany surrendered in May 1945, the total number of American forces in Europe were "over 61 ground divisions (Infantry and Armored), 6 Tactical Air Commands, and 2 Strategic Air Forces spread across Northwestern Europe and England."[12] Militarily, they had mobilized vast resources to help crush the Axis threat. Economically, the Second World War "pulled America out of prolonged depression, set off a boom in consumer as well as war production, and enabled her to extend her influence in the Pacific, East Asia, and the Middle East."[13] With the carnage left by the War throughout Europe and Asia, few countries commanded such a prominent position as the United States did in 1945. Even Britain, who had politically and economically been a dominant force throughout the World prior to 1939 and was considered by historians to be an equal to the Americans early in the War, would soon decolonize and reduce its overseas commitments. Within twenty years of the War's end, much of the British Empire had gained

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[11] Lloyd C Gardner, *Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, from Munich to Yalta*, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 263.

[12] Leo J. Daugherty III, "Preparing for the Long War: The United States Army and the Early Cold War Period 1945-1950," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 23, no. 2 (September 2010): 491-492, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2010.503153.

[13] David Reynolds, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-1945: Towards a New Synthesis," in *The "Special Relationship": Anglo-American Relations since 1945*, edited by William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 18.

independence. Militarily and economically, the World had shifted from one dominated by

the Old World to one directed by the New.

      While the United States had emerged as one of the most obvious victors of the Second

World War, the postwar realities soon placed new and difficult burdens on the country.

Having been isolationist in nature prior to 1941 and part of a world order dominated by

Britain and France, the Americans were politically ill-experienced for the geopolitical

situation after 1945. Professor André Gerolymatos of Simon Fraser University states that

"The Cold War landscape confronting the United States was, for the most part, terra

incognita[14], with the prospect of a nuclear holocaust looming on the horizon."[15] The 1948

coup d'état in Czechoslovakia is a key example that illustrated American un-readiness for

the postwar order. Following the Second World War, Czechoslovakia experienced

significant turmoil as democratic and communist groups violently vied for power.

Realizing they would be unable to democratically gain power through elections, the

communists launched a takeover of Prague in February and March of 1948 which "erased

the last remaining multi-party democracy in the Stalinist zone in Europe and caused the

western Allies to abandon hope for a peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union."[16] The

American Ambassador in Prague understood that the communist takeover of

Czechoslovakia meant that the country "would soon be rewarded with dictatorship by one

party, loss of national sovereignty, rule by terror, concentration camps, loss of all civic

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[14] Latin term for: Unknown land.

[15] André Gerolymatos, *Castles made of sand: a century of Anglo-American espionage and intervention in the Middle East* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010), 113-114.

[16] Igor Lukes, "The 1948 Coup d'État in Prague Through the Eyes of the American Embassy," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 22, no. 3 (September 2011): 431, DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2011.599644.

freedoms, and decades of gross economic decline and mismanagement."[17] However, as author Igor Lukes argued, the Americans showed a clear lack of leadership and intelligence and a complete surprise to the coup by responding too slowly and too late. This failure would be a stark reminder to the Americans of the new political realities after 1945 and that despite their strengths, they would need to rely upon allies if they were to successfully secure their position and prevent the spread of communism.

Not only were the Americans facing an uncertain future in Central Europe, but the Soviet Union was also seeking to secure its influence in the region. Having lost millions of soldiers and civilians during the Second World War and experienced invasion from other European powers for centuries, the Soviet Union took the opportunity to secure a buffer zone between Europe and Russia. However, as Gerolymatos points out, the Soviet Union's actions following the Second World War "gave every indication to Washington's political and military establishment of aggressive expansionism."[18] This placed the United States in a challenging situation. Having fought to liberate Europe from Nazi rule, they were unwilling to "tolerate a renewed subjugation of the continent (Germany included), by Moscow. On the other hand, a Germany reconstructed on the basis of democratic and capitalist principles was incompatible with Soviet Russia's objectives."[19] With their liberal tendencies and a desire to establish strong democracy in Western and Central Europe in order to thwart any possibility of future world wars, the Americans found that they were at loggerheads with Soviet objectives.

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[17] Ibid., 443.

[18] Gerolymatos, *Castles made of sand*, 121.

[19] Wolfgang Schlauch, "American Policy towards Germany, 1945," *Journal of Contemporary History* 5, no. 4 (1970): 113-114, http://www.jstor.org/stable/259868.

Understandably, American perceptions of the world changed. Communicating to

Bevin in early 1947, Lord Inverchapel stated that "The abandonment of the one-world idea

as the determining factor in the international outlook of this country, and the recognition

that the foreign policies of the United States and Soviet Union are diametrically opposed,

are thought to have been made none too soon."[20] Even though the Cold War had yet to

truly begin, Inverchapel's message to Bevin was clear: Soviet and American views on the

post-1945 world order were in stark contrast to each other and would be difficult to

reconcile.

On top of the political uncertainties after 1945, the United States was also militarily

stretched as the country demobilized its wartime army and took on postwar

responsibilities. The military shrank in a period of 22 months from nearly 12 million men

and women to "a force barely exceeding 500,000 with only 10 understrength divisions, of

which only two were fully prepared for combat."[21] On top of that, the Americans had to

divide military resources between Europe and the Western Pacific. By June 1, 1950,

108,500 troops were stationed in East Asia and some 14,300 troops in Germany and

Austria.[22] In Germany, the main task of American forces were to "oversee the

administration and establishment of a military government charged with the rounding up

of Nazi war criminals, repatriation of prisoners of war and refugees, and the re-

[20] Archibald Clark Kerr (Lord Inverchapel), "Weekly Political Summary," In *Part IV: From 1946 through 1950. Series C North America 1947: United States January 1947-December 1947*. Vol. 2 edited by Richard D.G. Crockatt of *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, edited by Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, (University Publications of America, 2001), 311.
[21] Daugherty III, "Preparing for the Long War," 493.
[22] Ibid., 507.

establishment of public services."[23] In contrast to the size of the American military in

Germany, NATO intelligence analysts estimated that by April 1950 the Soviets had

hundreds of thousands of troops and 6000 front line aircraft in East Germany.[24] The vast

disparity between the American and Soviet forces, the sudden increase in global

commitments after 1945, the tensions with the Soviet Union, and the political inexperience

of the United States as a great power, placed the Americans in a precarious position. Until

1949, the United States could defend their position through a very limited number of

atomic bombs, making up for their conventional weakness. However, such a nuclear

primacy would not last forever and the instability in the wake of the Second World War

meant that the Americans would need additional support if they were to secure the peace.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain sought to maintain a strong

international position that would ensure it ranked with the other two primary victors, the

Soviet Union and the United States. Unable to achieve this goal, the British focused on

becoming America's most important ally. As noted by Michael Spirtas, a fellow at the

Center for National Policy and a research fellow at U.S. Crest, "Implementing this strategy

required that Britain prevent other states from coming between it and the United States."[25]

Britain's position benefited from the continued positive perception towards them in the

United States. According to Lord Inverchapel, the Americans had developed a more

positive view of Britain in light of the increased Soviet-American tensions. "Britain is

looked upon as a useful and congenial ally whose support for the American position is

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[23] Ibid., 504-505.
[24] Ibid., 513-514.
[25] Michael Spirtas, "French twist: French and British Nato policies from 1949 to 1966," *Security Studies* 8, no. 2-3 (1998): 311. DOI: 10.1080/09636419808429381.

virtually taken for granted."[26] Inverchapel's belief was well founded as Britain's reaction to

a variety of crises was recognized as being vital to American strategic interests.

One of the first examples of Britain supporting what would become important

interests for the United States occurred over the Italian port city of Trieste, just prior to the

capitulation of Germany in May 1945. In October 1944, Churchill and Stalin agreed through

the Percentages Agreement to divide the Balkans into spheres of influence, establishing a

regional balance of power. As Lloyd Gardner wrote, discussions between Churchill and

Stalin accepted the principle that "Russia should have 90 percent predominance in

Rumania, Great Britain 90 percent in Greece. They would share fifty-fifty in Yugoslavia and

Hungary, and Russia would have 75 predominance in Bulgaria."[27] Although this agreement

challenged America's Wilsonian values, historian Richard Dinardo contends that as the

British were not geographically separated from Soviet military power like the Americans,

they needed to negotiate with the Soviet Union to reduce tensions.[28]

Located along the Adriatic Sea, Trieste was regarded as a British interest and

therefore part of the integral lines of communication for Britain and the Empire. In May

1945, a war scare emerged as Tito's Yugoslav partisans claimed Trieste at the same time

New Zealand forces arrived to occupy the city. Recognizing the threat to their interests,

Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander of Mediterranean Forces, felt that the

Western Allies must "prepare either for a possible show-down or for a diplomatic defeat.

To evict the Yugoslavs by force would require eleven divisions and, if Russia decided to

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[26] Kerr (Lord Inverchapel), "Weekly Political Summary," 312.

[27] Gardner, *Spheres of Influence*, 198.

[28] Richard S. Dinardo, "Glimpse of an Old World Order? Reconsidering the Trieste Crisis of 1945," *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 379, http://proxy.lib.sfu.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=9707223049&site=ehost-live.

support Tito, the consequences would be incalculable."[29] Both the United States and

Britain jointly pressured Tito to withdraw. The crisis, resolved by limited Soviet

involvement and the Belgrade Agreement, saw the establishment of an Allied

Administration in the region in June 1945. Writing in 1991, J.R. Whittam of the University

of Bristol stated that the crisis over Trieste was "perhaps the first significant success for the

Western Allies in what was soon to be called the Cold War."[30] As a result of resisting

Yugoslav pressure and negotiating with the Soviet Union through the Percentages

Agreement, the British had helped prevent communism from expanding westward into

Italy and secured a city that could be used to assist the growing interests in the

Mediterranean by the United States. Centuries of experience in European geopolitics

meant that the British were well aware of the interests at stake on the continent.

The Middle East would become the next area of contention. The Second World War

had essentially left Britain and the Soviet Union as the primary actors in the Middle East

and Iran. Sir Frank Kenyon Roberts, a British diplomat in Moscow, told Bevin in January

1946 that "Britain alone stands in the way of the Soviet Union, and the Governments whom

Britain is allied are for the most part impervious to Soviet infiltration tactics."[31] Roberts

recognized the Soviets' expansionist desires and that Britain's Middle East influence

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[29] J.R. Whittam, "Drawing the Line: Britain and the Emergence of the Trieste Question, January 1941-May 1945," *The English Historical Review* 106, no. 419 (April 1991): 369. http://www.jstor.org/stable/573106.

[30] Ibid., 370.

[31] Frank Kenyon Roberts, "Soviet policy in the Middle East. Analysis of the effect on Middle Eastern problems of the new Soviet approach towards all questions of foreign policy," *From 1946 through 1950. Series A The Soviet Union and Finland 1946: Northern Affairs, January 1946-June 1946:* vol. 1 edited by Anita Prazmowska of *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, edited by Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, (University Publications of America, 1999), 20.

hindered the Soviet Union's ability to access the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.[32]

Soviet expansion into the Middle East would potentially threaten communication and trade

networks vital to Britain's Empire and status as a world power.[33] Roberts' report to Bevin

shows a clear recognition by the British of their role in preventing a single state,

particularly the Soviet Union, from gaining complete dominance in the region.

The Americans also acknowledged the vital role Britain had in securing the Middle

East. When the Soviet Union began to diplomatically pressure Turkey and Iran for

concessions to support the Kremlin's interests, the Americans recognized Iranian and

Turkish vulnerability in the region. In response to a request from Secretary of State Byrnes

and President Truman, the American Joint Chiefs declared that the future of their nation

would be tied to Britain. They felt that the defeat or sudden disintegration of the British

Empire "'would eliminate from Eurasia the last bulwark of resistance between the United

States and Soviet expansion. After this the military potential of the United States together

with the military potential of possible allies bound to her ideologically might be insufficient

to match those of an expanded Soviet Union.'"[34] With continued Soviet pressure on Iran

and Turkey, the Truman Administration came "to designate the Near East a region vital to

American security and to be worth a world war."[35] As argued by Historian Eduard Mark,

the American desire to continue the security role Britain had established in the region

forced the Soviet Union to drop its pressure on Turkey and Iran. It also challenged Soviet

thinking that "the rival imperialisms of Britain and America must fall out to the ultimate

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[32] Ibid., 19.
[33] Ibid., 24.
[34] Eduard Mark, "The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences," *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 3 (Summer 1997), 392.
[35] Ibid., 411-412.

advantage of the USSR."[36] The crisis in 1946 highlighted for the United States the role

Britain had in stabilizing a region that was increasingly important to American interests

and since that time has remained fundamental in shaping American foreign policies and

priorities.

The Greek Civil War is perhaps one of the most important examples of where British

involvement in the structure of postwar Europe was eventually intertwined with America's

long-term grand-strategy. The German occupation of Greece from 1941 to 1944 devastated

the country. By the time the Germans evacuated in 1944, the population had "suffered

occupation, famine, reprisals, and even a small genocide. These cataclysms had brutalized

and desensitized Greek society—people became harder, almost pitiless, and too easily

tolerant of killings and torture."[37] In addition, the occupation had destroyed the

institutions of government and the resulting turmoil forced people to pledge allegiance to

either the provisional government or to guerilla bands, neither of which had the power to

end the anarchy in Greece.[38]

Having historic connections to Greece and strategic interests in the Eastern

Mediterranean, the British were deeply involved in Greece's postwar future. From late

1944 to 1947, Britain provided assistance to stabilize the country and restore the

government-in-exile. The British were particularly concerned about communist forces as

they were "expected to try to deliver the country to its Communist masters, who were in

turn certain to prove subservient to Stalin and thus hostile to Britain's continued pre-

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[36] Ibid., 413.
[37] André Gerolymatos, *Red acropolis, black terror: the Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American Rivalry, 1943-1949* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 116.
[38] Ibid., 117.

eminence in Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean."[39] Through the Percentages

Agreement and by advocating their strong regional interests, the British gained assurances

from the Soviets that they would not support the Greek communists.[40] While Britain had

prevented the expansion of Soviet influence, the financially strapped British found

supporting Greece a significant burden. Unwilling to see Greece fall to communism, the

British requested American intervention in February 1947, representing the end of British

regional dominance. The British argued that "if the United States did not assume Britain's

place, the entire Middle East and the Balkans would shortly fall to the Soviets."[41] This

argument was influential as the Truman Administration made extensive efforts to support

Greece and to convince Congress to allocate funds for the Greek Government. Speaking to

Congress in what would become known as the Truman Doctrine, the President declared

"Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting

democracy. The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to

Greece certain types of relief and economic aid, but these are inadequate. There is no other

country to which democratic Greece can turn."[42] Truman further extended his desire not

only to help Greece, but also other nations throughout the world to achieve stability,

freedom, and democracy; the core of the Truman Doctrine. As a result of British insistence

and with Truman's successful appeal for American financial intervention, "Greece escaped

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[39] John O. Latrides and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, "The International Dimension of the Greek Civil War," *World Policy Journal* 17, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 92, http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/stable/40209681.
[40] Gerolymatos, *Red acropolis, black terror*, 126-127.
[41] Ibid., 217.
[42] Harry Truman, "Text of President Truman's Speech on Greece and Turkey," In *Part IV: From 1946 through 1950. Series C North America 1947: United States January 1948-December 1947*. Vol. 2 edited by Richard D.G. Crockatt of *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, edited by Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, (University Publications of America, 2001), 81.

the ugly postwar fate of its Balkan neighbors."[43] While Britain had primarily acted to serve

its own interests, the ultimate result was to benefit the United States. Not only did the

situation provide an opportunity for the Americans to give aid to the Greeks, but also

demonstrate to the rest of the World their support for democratic states.

What stood out as a particularly important role for Britain was the postwar

occupation of Germany and the British response to the Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949. In

their postwar planning at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945, the Allies divided both Germany and

Berlin amongst the occupying powers. The talks were dominated by the Americans and

Soviets who benefitted the most by the division of Germany. Although no longer as

dominant as either the Soviet Union or the United States, Britain, being the only other

power at the conference, was in a unique position as they "had the prestige and, despite her

economic difficulties, the political experience and military power to make an independent

voice heard."[44]

In the years prior to the Blockade, Britain faced a challenging dilemma over their

occupation zone. Devastated by the War, their zone in Germany could only produce forty

percent of its food requirements. With war rationing in Britain and domestic resentment

towards the Germans, the British understandably struggled to respond to the situation.[45]

To help relieve their burden of occupation, Britain sought greater cooperation with the

United States and France over Germany's future. However, feeling frustrated and left out of

the postwar planning, the Soviet Union imposed first a partial blockade on April 1, 1948,

followed by a full-scale blockade of all rail, road, and water travel to the western zones of

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[43] Latrides and Rizopoulos, "The International Dimension of the Greek Civil War," 100.
[44] Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, 844.
[45] Shlaim, "Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War," 2.

Berlin on June 24. The Blockade was intended to pressure the Western Allies to resume

negotiations over the future status of Germany.

With limited supplies available in West Berlin, Allied military planners proposed the

use of conventional military force to bring supplies into the city. The Administration in

Washington could not decide on a clear and immediate response to the crisis. Britain, on

the other hand, provided more concrete solutions to the Blockade by articulating the need

for an Airlift and giving encouragement necessary for the Americans to become involved.

With a solution in mind, Bevin and "the British Cabinet quickly resolved to do everything to

supply Berlin by air and to concert a common policy in this matter with the governments of

the United States and France."[46] Although the Americans took the primary role in the

Airlift, the British had given a solution that "spared the Western leaders the agonizing

choice between an appeal to arms and ignominious retreat."[47] In contrast to

historiography of the Berlin Blockade and Airlift, Shlaim argues that the British response to

the crisis and the pressure they placed on the United States was "exceedingly hawkish."[48]

While new crises would emerge over Berlin throughout the Cold War, the success of the

Airlift helped to secure West Berlin as a part of West Germany and acted as a vital symbol

of resistance to communist authority. Britain's role had been vital in formulating the

response for the Western Allies and as one of the two primary contributors to the Airlift,

the crisis supported the development of the Anglo-American special relationship.

These crises helped convince the Americans of the need for active involvement in

postwar Europe alongside like-minded countries in order to support areas vital to

[46] Ibid., 5.
[47] Ibid., 6.
[48] Ibid., 14.

American grand strategy. The Truman Doctrine and the American resolve to support

Europe's security would not have been possible if such a sense of crisis had not been

present and if Britain had not been as active in postwar Europe.

The recognized need for such cooperation began many years prior to the formation of

NATO. Writing to the British Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden on June

20, 1944, Gladwyn Jebb, the Head of the Economic and Reconstruction Department of the

Foreign Office, presented arguments for and against British security involvement in

Europe. His argument concluded "Britain's political and strategic interests *did* require the

formation of a Western security group and that Britain should play its part in such a

group."[49] The crises of the late 1940s alarmed the British and convinced them of both the

threat of Soviet capabilities to expand into Western Europe and the inability of Western

European states to take on Soviet power alone. They concluded that success lay in greater

cooperation with the United States. Churchill demonstrated this need in his speech in

Fulton, Missouri in 1946. Mentioning the permanent defence arrangements between the

United States and Canada, Churchill argued that such a defence agreement should be

expanded:

> If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealths be added to that of the
> United States, with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, and in
> science and industry, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer
> its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an
> overwhelming assurance of security.[50]

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[49] Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment," 616.

[50] Winston Churchill, "Proposed Anglo-American alliance. Speech at Westminster
College, Fulton, Missouri. Call for an Anglo-American military alliance. Its consistency with
the world organisation," In *Part IV: From 1946 through 1950. Series C North America 1946*.
Vol. 1 edited by Richard D.G. Crockatt of *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and
Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, edited by Paul Preston and Michael
Partridge, (University Publications of America, 1999), 28.

For Churchill, an Anglo-American alliance would not only fulfill British security objectives, but also help Britain maintain an influential role in World politics.

Approaching the Americans on greater cooperation in January 1948, Britain found the United States reluctant to establish a long-term commitment to Europe. At the same time, Bevin recognized "'that Western Europe cannot yet stand on its own feet without assurance of support.'"[51] With the American reluctance and the fear of Soviet expansionism, Bevin felt that if Britain, France, and the Benelux countries could reach a defensive agreement, it would "convince the Americans that West European states were prepared to stand on their own feet."[52] Such an agreement emerged in 1948 in the form of the Brussels Pact. This defensive pact was, as argued by John Baylis, a clear demonstration to the Americans of Western European resolve to their own security "even before the guarantee of American assistance was forthcoming. Without the Brussels Pact, therefore, it is difficult to imagine that NATO would have become a reality."[53] The new Pact laid the foundation for an alliance based around the North Atlantic to develop and came to reflect the new realities in Europe following 1945.

Faced with the changing situation in Europe and the clear commitment of Western European states to their own security, the Americans became interested in greater cooperation. According to Nikolaj Peterson, a Senior Lecturer in the Political Science Institute at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, the United States was also threatened by events in Europe and their involvement in two world wars showed that they were "unable

[51] Nikolaj Petersen, "Who Pulled Whom and How Much? Britain, the United States and the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 11, no. 2 (June 1982): 97, DOI: 10.1177/03058298820110020201.
[52] Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment," 627.
[53] Ibid.

to tolerate the creation of a European hegemony, and that isolationism was not a viable

foreign policy."[54] On March 8, 1948, John Hickerson of the American State Department

published a memo stating that "the European situation now contained two dangers: Soviet

miscalculation of how far it could push its expansionist tactics and European defeatism in

the absence of American support."[55] For Petersen, the concerns apparent within the State

Department came to reflect British sentiments. The American Military was also supportive

of a commitment to Europe seeing it as essential to national security, although they were

concerned about involvement before improvements were made to the US military.[56] While

the State Department was ahead of British thinking at times, Peterson felt "that Bevin's

approach in the winter of 1948 was instrumental in initiating and then accelerating the

policy process in Washington."[57] The British had thus helped to influence the development

of American policy and laid the foundation for NATO.

The 1948 Washington Exploratory Talks between Canada, Britain, the Benelux

countries, and the United States recognized that an American presence alone would not be

enough for long-term European security. They felt an organization would be needed and

agreed that the 'stepping stone' territories of Iceland, Denmark, Greenland, Norway,

Ireland, and Portugal should be included to ensure the security of the North Atlantic in the

event of war. The Talks also established the level of cooperation available in the alliance,

"ranging from full membership to limited membership and special arrangements."[58] While

many issues still needed to be worked out, the countries understood the realities of

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[54] Petersen, "Who Pulled Whom and How Much?," 107.
[55] Ibid., 98.
[56] Ibid., 102-103.
[57] Ibid., 109.
[58] Ibid., 104.

protecting Western Europe from future aggression and created values that have remained

integral to NATO and NATO's expansion.

In April 1949, the foreign ministers of twelve states, including Britain, met in

Washington for the signature ceremony of the North Atlantic Treaty, formally creating

NATO. On April 7, 1949, Sir Oliver Franks communicated to Prime Minister Clement Attlee

the results of the signing of the Treaty. Franks stated that President Truman:

> emphasized the determination of the signatories to provide better lives for their
> people without sacrificing common ideals of justice and human worth. The treaty
> would, he hoped, 'create a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression—a
> bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and
> society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens.[59]

When the North Atlantic Treaty went to ratification in the American Senate in August 1949,

Franks reported to Bevin that the senators recognized the role of the United States in

securing Western Europe. Franks also felt that the senators showed a sentiment that "was

sober and unhysterical, and the recognition of the need for friends and allies in any future

major conflict was healthy and reassuring."[60] The opinions expressed by Truman and

Congress on the formation of NATO reflected changing American perceptions towards

global events and recognition that Americans need to become involved in the security of

not just Western Europe, but the whole World. While this change arose domestically, the

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[59] Sir Oliver Franks, "North Atlantic Treaty. Ceremony of signature of the North Atlantic Treaty at Washington on 4th April. Speech by President Truman," In *Part IV: From 1946 through 1950. Series C North America-1948-1949*. edited by Richard D.G. Crockatt of *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, edited by Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, (University Publications of America, 2000), 165.

[60] Sir Oliver Franks, "North Atlantic Treaty—Ratification by Senate," In *Part IV: From 1946 through 1950. Series C North America-1948-1949*. edited by Richard D.G. Crockatt of *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, edited by Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, (University Publications of America, 2000), 200-201.

determination of the British set the foundations for American involvement in postwar

security and ensured the creation of NATO which remains as relevant to the security of

Europe in 2015 as in 1949.

Along with their roles in the crises of the early Cold War and the formation of NATO,

Britain also played a militarily recognizable role working alongside the Americans. The

major development that helped bring the British and Americans towards greater military

cooperation was the emergence of nuclear weapons. The destructive power of such

weapons, as demonstrated on Japan in August 1945, convinced the British of the potential

these weapons would have in future wars. As suggested by Dr. Alfred Goldberg, a Senior

Historian with the US Air Force, Britain's concern of losing centuries of influence as a great

power helped to convince them of their need for atomic weapons.[61] This would

demonstrate to the Americans that Britain continued to be a reliable and dependable ally.

"If atomic power was the price of remaining a great state, it seemed to many to be also the

price of maintaining a special relationship with the United States."[62] The crises of the early

Cold War illustrated the tense conditions that existed and the need for both an improved

military and political capability in order to respond to new challenges.

Britain, however, was denied access to American nuclear technology by the McMahon

Act. Baylis argued that the Act supported Americans' desire to maintain a monopoly until

an international control system could be created.[63] As a result, Britain began to develop

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[61] Alfred Goldberg, "The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 40, no. 3 (July 1964): 427, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2610825.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Baylis, "The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interdependence." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no.3 (2008): 427, DOI: 10.1080/01402390802024726.

nuclear facilities from scratch, making it "by far the most formidable and complicated of all postwar projects."[64] Having developed and tested their own atomic weapons by 1952, the British became staunchly supportive of a nuclear deterrent independent of the Americans. The Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir John Slessor, wrote in *Strategy for the West* in 1954 that if Britain were to rely upon the nuclear deterrent of an ally, Britain would "'sink to the level of a fourth-rate Power. In peace we should lose our great influence in Allied policy and planning; in war we should have little influence on the direction of Allied strategy or on the determination of terms of peace."[65] In March 1955, Churchill also supported the need for a British commitment to Western deterrence. "'Unless we make a contribution of our own… we cannot be sure that in an emergency the resources of other Powers would be planned exactly as we would wish, or that the targets which would threaten us most would be given what we consider the necessary priority or the deserved priority, in the first few hours.'"[66] Such concerns by Slessor and Churchill indicate serious doubts that Britain's allies would defend the British in the event of a nuclear conflict. An independent British nuclear deterrent would also support longer term American interests.

In order to deter Soviet aggression against NATO, Britain focused its nuclear weapons towards the Soviet Union. "What is known is that by 1963/1964 Britain had developed a nuclear strategy suitable for fulfilling national requirements through 'minimum'

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[64] Goldberg, "The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent," 418-419.

[65] Richard Gott, "The Evolution of the Independent British Deterrent," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 39, no. 2 (April 1963): 242, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2611300.

[66] Ibid., 243.

deterrence."[67] By 1968, the British deterrence included targeting seven to ten cities and a

minimum level of fifty percent destruction of Moscow and Leningrad.[68] While independent

of the United States nuclear command and control, the British nuclear deterrence ensured

the Soviet Union could not eliminate all the nuclear weapons of the Western Allies, thus

discouraging the Soviets from recklessly launching a nuclear war. While the British forces

could not completely destroy the Soviet Union, the weapons program "was to deter a war,

not to win it."[69] Justin Bronk, a historian with the International History Department at the

London School of Economics and Political Science, argues that while a massive retaliation

against the Soviet Union would not have been possible without the United States, British

nuclear forces could inflict enough damage to deter a Soviet attack.[70] Britain's deployment

of its nuclear forces would be enough to convince the Soviet Union that any strike against

the British would result in extensive losses, even if no American response was forthcoming.

This would, according to Martin A. Smith, help satisfy NATO allies, deter the Soviet Union,

and satisfy the United States that Europeans were committed to defending Europe without

relying solely on the Americans for support.[71] Starting in the 1950s and continuing for the

rest of the Cold War, Britain would be regarded as the second centre of nuclear decision-

making within the NATO alliance, further complicating the Soviet Union's assessment when

calculating the risks posed by war.

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[67] Kristan Stoddart, "Maintaining the 'Moscow Criterion': British Strategic Nuclear Targeting 1974-1979." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 6 (2008): 900. DOI: 10.1080/01402390802373198.

[68] Ibid., 901.

[69] Justin Bronk, "Britain's 'Independent' V-Bomber Force and US Nuclear Weapons, 1957-1962," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, no. 6-7 (2014): 976, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2013.770736.

[70] Ibid., 975.

[71] Martin A. Smith, "British nuclear weapons and NATO in the Cold War and beyond," *International Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2011): 1393, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01042.x

Through the 1950s, the Americans increasingly saw Britain as vital to their security. Their reluctance to cooperate on nuclear weapons declined as global events, like the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, made the American public feel technologically behind their Soviet rivals and therefore vulnerable.[72] At the same time, Britain, facing budgetary constraints, began to consider reducing its conventional forces allocated to NATO. Concerned about the potential reduction and the struggle against communism, the Americans decided to undertake nuclear cooperation with the British in order to convince them not to reduce the size of their conventional military forces and to gain their support for American foreign policy.[73] Like Britain, the Americans faced financial limitations and as a result, President Eisenhower sought to reduce the financial burden of American forces stationed in Europe.[74] The sharing of nuclear technologies would help the British develop their nuclear capabilities and ensure the Americans would have an ally in Europe ready and able to defend NATO from aggression without having to depend solely upon American intervention.

Despite the limits on cooperation imposed by the McMahon Act, the period of 1946 to 1958 saw the continuation of Anglo-American nuclear cooperation that had started with the Manhattan Project through discussions between intelligence officials, nuclear scientists, and service personnel in both countries.[75] Along with the Administration, other American agencies, such as the United States Atomic Energy Commission, supported cooperation with Britain as they felt that the British could make a substantial contribution to American security. They proposed on January 27, 1958 that the President "be given discretion to

[72] Baylis, "The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement," 436-437.
[73] Ibid., 439.
[74] Ibid., 457.
[75] Ibid., 447.

exchange any atomic information with an ally which was making 'substantial and material

contributions to national defence and security'."[76]

The increasing recognition by the Americans of the value of Britain in their defence

culminated in 1958 with Britain and the United States signing the MDA (Mutual Defence

Agreement). Article 2A of the Agreement called for joint research and development,

exchange of technology, and military training and planning.[77] Article 2B "also allowed for

the communication of information, by one Party to the other, to improve the recipient's

'atomic weapon design, development and fabrication capability'."[78] Since 1958, the MDA

has continuously been renewed with the most recent renewal extending nuclear

cooperation to 2024.[79] Baylis argues that although Britain gained more in scientific and

technical terms than the United States, "the 1958 Agreement was based on an American

belief, especially within the scientific community, that Britain had something to offer the

United States."[80] Baylis' belief indicates both the Americans and the British had much to

gain from the Agreement.

With the development of Britain's nuclear weapons and the establishment of efforts

to cooperate on nuclear technology, Britain's ability to support the Americans and NATO

was fundamentally expanded. Cooperation emerged primarily with developments in the

conventional and nuclear capabilities of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. The Navy

acknowledged that Britain and NATO would rely upon secure sea routes and

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[76] Gott, "The Evolution of the Independent British Deterrent," 245-246.
[77] Baylis, "The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement," 446.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Claire Mills, "UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement," *House of Commons Library* (October 20, 2014), http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03147/SN03147.pdf.
[80] Baylis, "The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement," 460.

communications if war with the Soviet Union occurred and that Britain would have a vital

role in denying enemy vessels and aircraft the opportunity to challenge NATO maritime

activities.[81] While the Navy, including the First Sea Lord Louis Mountbatten, were initially

reluctant to accept nuclear submarines and Polaris missiles for the submarines, the British

use of them from the 1960s onward came to demonstrate the Royal Navy's commitment to

NATO's nuclear deterrence.[82] Andrew Priest, a lecturer in the Department of International

Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, wrote that by using Polaris, the British

ensured their "deterrent remained operational for decades rather than years and that the

unique working relationship on nuclear matters between Britain and America continued

and prospered."[83] The development of a nuclear submarine force for the Royal Navy

illustrated the role Britain had in also protecting NATO, American interests, and the United

States itself. Andrea Ellner, of the Graduate Institute of Political and International Studies

at the University of Reading, describes the British nuclear submarines as necessary in

supporting Anglo-American relations because of their ability to target Soviet nuclear sites

aimed at the United States.[84] Ellner argues that the British nuclear submarine force

showed Britain as a partner committed to both enhancing NATO's nuclear deterrence and

to protecting the United States. In contrast to the belief that the nuclear agreement

emerged out of a common and shared history, Priest argues that American politicians "saw

a British nuclear deterrent as one of the ways that the UK could maintain a global defence

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[81] Andrea Ellner, "Carrier Airpower in the Royal Navy during the Cold War: The International Strategic Context," *Defence & Security Analysis* 22, no. 1 (August 3, 2006): 26, DOI: 10.1080/14751790600577108.
    [82] Ibid., 28-29.
    [83] Andrew Priest, "In American Hands: Britain, the United States and the Polaris Nuclear Project 1962-1968," *Contemporary British History* 19, no. 3 (2005): 354, DOI: 10.1080/13619460500100450.
    [84] Ellner, "Carrier Airpower in the Royal Navy during the Cold War," 29.

policy, which directly impacted on the way the technical relationship developed."[85] The

use of the Trident missile system by Britain's nuclear submarines in the twenty-first

century shows a continuation of the nuclear cooperation and shared strategic interests that

emerged during the Cold War.

In addition to the Navy, the Royal Air Force had a significant role in supporting the

British nuclear deterrence, NATO, and the United States. After the Second World War, the

RAF was the only branch of the British military who had the capability to use atomic

weapons. "The nature of the weapon lent itself to airborne delivery, and the R.A.F. Bomber

Command had a mighty experience in strategic bombardment that made it uniquely

qualified to carry the bomb."[86] The expense of conventional forces in the early 1950s, at a

time when Britain's economy was still ailing, convinced the British that a nuclear

deterrence would be less expensive and more effective to ensure Britain remained

militarily capable in the Cold War. The British decided to employ a variety of bomber

variants (V-bombers) which established an airborne nuclear deterrent and allowed them to

attack most major targets in the Soviet Union.[87] While it was a small force, the Americans

recognized their value in supporting American military objectives. "Although its total

strength never numbered much more than 180 V-bombers plus tankers, Bomber Command

was readily accepted by the United States as an organic part of an Anglo-American nuclear

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[85] Priest, "In American Hands," 368.

[86] Alfred Goldberg, "The Military Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 40, no. 4 (October 1964): 602, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2611727.

[87] Ibid., 617.

deterrent force that realised a high degree of integration through co-ordination of targets and operational plans."[88]

The overall military deployments supported American objectives of diversifying NATO's defensive capabilities and in containing the Soviet Union from expanding into the areas core to American interests. Militarily Britain was an indispensable ally to the Americans' Cold War grand strategy. The alliance between the two countries demonstrates that their common strategic interests, values, and goals complement each other and shows the rest of the World the benefits of bilateral cooperation.

In an interview with Jon Sopel of the BBC in July 2015, American President Barack Obama articulated that the United States looks towards Britain as a source of hope, inspiration, and support when dealing with current security crises. Speaking on British involvement in the coalition campaign in Syria and Iraq against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, Obama said that "In modern times there's no country where we have closer affinity in terms of values, and on the international stage a nation with greater capacity."[89] He further articulated that Britain's position in the European Union strengthens the United States' belief that such institutions can remain functional, that the security and stability of the continent can be maintained, and that the values he feels the United States, Britain, and the whole World should share are promoted and recognized.[90] Continuing to cooperate and evolve their military and political relationship will show the flexibility of Britain and the United States to respond to new crises. With individuals like Inverchapel, Franks, Churchill, and Bevin having fought to bring the Americans and British together for a

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[88] Ibid., 617-618.
[89] "Full transcript of BBC interview with President Barack Obama," *BBC News*, 24 July 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33646542.
[90] Ibid.

common security cause in the late 1940s, British political leaders will want to continue this postwar legacy.

In the initial years of the Cold War, the Americans, having taken over Britain's key position as the security provider in Europe, found that they were stretched in priorities and forced to confront crises for which they had no experience. Britain, with its political experience, became a key asset in supporting and influencing the Americans in these new situations. The British helped to secure Western Europe from Soviet expansionism, to create NATO for collective security, and to provide a nuclear deterrence capability for Western European security, all serving the United States' strategic interests. Far from showing that Britain was insignificant after 1945, their response to events demonstrates the significant role they played in helping to establish and secure American interests and European security. Though the belief remains that America dominated, political scientist Marc Trachtenberg points out this is indeed not the case for "the more one understands the real story, the more one is able to see how misleading and indeed how pernicious myths of that sort can be."[91] This attitude may lead historians to reconsider the role played by countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union in shaping the Cold War and result in a need for historiography to encompass these countries in future narratives. Deeper analysis will ensure the understanding of the Cold War reflects this reality. Only then will the true scope of the Cold War and its legacy be fully comprehended.

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[91] Marc Trachtenberg, *The Cold War and after: history, theory, and the logic of international politics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), 310.

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